Modi’s Doctrine & Indian Foreign Policy
Foreign policy of a country serves its national interest and economic growth, hence Indian foreign policy decisions are now driven by pragmatic benefit unlike idealism in the previous decades. This explains India’s practical approach to energy, technology, and trade, even with political rivals. India’s proclaimed neutrality often masks the prioritisation of national interests: flexible diplomacy helps secure advantages while minimising political costs. Success will be judged by tangible outcomes: sustained growth, technological advancement, territorial security, institutional influence. If India maintains strategic autonomy while leveraging partnerships, champions multilateral reform while avoiding futile anti-Western posturing, and balances principle with pragmatism, the Modi Doctrine may represent viable 21st-century statecraft model for rising powers navigating multipolarity.
Since PM Modi took office in 2014, India has undergone a fundamental foreign policy transformation characterized by strategic autonomy, economic statecraft, and proactive multilateralism. This brief commentary examines the emerging Modi Doctrine through analysis of recent developments including the historic India-EU trade deal (January 2026), India's BRICS presidency (2026), the India AI Summit, and bilateral relationships with Russia, France, EU, Japan, Central Asia, Iran, Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and South Asia.
The Modi Doctrine represents fundamental foreign policy reorientation embracing power, eschewing non-alignment pieties, and proactively shaping international order. Over twelve years, Modi government demonstrated continuity pursuing core objectives: securing continental periphery, expanding connectivity, diversifying partnerships, amplifying global governance voice. The February 2026 US-India trade deal, BRICS presidency, and AI Summit collectively illustrate three dimensions: economic pragmatism (accepting US energy conditionalities for market access), institutional entrepreneurship (rebranding BRICS with 'humanity first'), and technological sovereignty (sovereign AI models, standard-setting). Significant challenges persist: turbulent neighborhood (Pakistan insurgency post-Operation Sindoor, Afghanistan humanitarian catastrophe, Sri Lankan debt crisis, Myanmar civil war), managing China challenge (balancing economic interdependence with strategic competition), and domestic concerns about democratic backsliding.
India engages in many international formats while preserving its strategic autonomy. Its foreign policy is shaped by a small group of advisors near the Prime Minister, which ensures speed and predictability but also increases personalisation. Key foreign policy decisions are made by a close circle around the Prime Minister (the cabinet). The country consistently presents itself as the "voice of the Global South," a role it has reinforced since its successful G20 Summit in Delhi. India’s top priority is maintaining strategic autonomy and participating in numerous formats without binding commitments.
India’s red lines are well defined
India draws a clear line at nations or ideologies that it sees as a direct threat to its sovereignty (primarily Pakistan-based cross-border terrorism) or as hegemonic in a way that leaves no room for its own rise (which is where the relationship with China remains deeply fraught). As the West deepens its embrace, India must continue to skillfully manage its other relationships (with Russia, with the Global South, and even with a wary China) to maintain the very "multi-alignment" that made it so attractive in the first place.
The Ukraine conflict has placed unprecedented strain on the India-Russia partnership. India's dramatic increase in Russian crude purchases—becoming Russia's second-largest customer by 2023—provided Moscow economic lifeline but triggered US punitive tariffs. India's February 2026 commitment to halt/reduce Russian oil purchases marks decisive shift. Energy pivot erodes relationship's economic foundation beyond legacy defense systems like S-400, BrahMos joint venture. Russia's deepening dependence on China post-2022 (trade exceeding $200B vs $50B with India) limits Moscow's ability to serve as independent pole. Scholarly consensus characterizes relationship as transitioning from strategic partnership to tactical interlocutorship (Mohan, 2023; Pant, 2023).
The West needs a reliable, democratic counterweight to China and resilient supply chains. India needs technology, investment, and strategic partnerships to fuel its own rise and secure its neighborhood. But nevertheless, India will maintain strategic autonomy. Our red lines are always clear: sovereignty and territorial integrity are non-negotiable, and we advocate consistently for a rule-based international order. At the same time, we are pragmatic and open to cooperation with all, provided our core interests are respected. India will not become a formal military ally of the US or NATO. Its relationship with Russia, particularly in defense, will remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future.
India is no longer just a "market" to be captured or a "balancer" to be wooed. It has become an indispensable partner —a nation whose presence at the table is now considered essential for any global solution, whether it is climate, technology, trade, or security. The world is not just coming to India for handshakes; they are coming for contracts, investments, and results. The pressure is now on India to execute—to reform its bureaucratic processes, upgrade its infrastructure, and skill its workforce at a pace that matches the geopolitical momentum.
